SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
Senator Thomas Umberg, Chair
2025-2026 Regular Session

SB 747 (Wiener)
Version: January 5, 2026
Hearing Date: January 13, 2026
Fiscal: No
Urgency: Yes
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SUBJECT

Civil rights: deprivation of federal constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities

DIGEST

This bill provides a cause of action for violations of one's constitutional rights by government officials, and fees and costs, to be applied retroactively.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("Section 1983"), a cause of action is provided to those whose rights are violated under color of law. However, this does not afford a cause of action where the defendants are federal officials. Historically, plaintiffs have relied on a court-made doctrine to bring such actions, however courts have recently been increasingly resistant to inferring a right of action against federal defendants. Additionally, existing statutory paths to seeking remedies, at both the state and federal levels, are onerous and provided only limited relief.

This bill establishes the "No Kings Act." It creates a state level analog of Section 1983, allowing for a cause of action against governmental officials when their constitutional rights have been violated. It does not bestow individuals with any additional substantive rights, rather a more explicit cause of action to vindicate their constitutional rights. The bill imports the same immunities currently afforded governmental defendants under existing law. Given the recent incidents in which federal officials are alleged to have unlawfully intruded on Californians' rights, the bill applies retroactively to March 1, 2025.

The bill is sponsored by Protect Democracy United, the Prosecutors Alliance Action, and the Inland Coalition for Immigrant Justice. It is supported by legal services organizations and several counties, including the Orange County Board of Supervisors. It is opposed by a coalition of law enforcement groups, including the California State Sheriffs' Association.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE LAW

Existing federal law:

1) Provides that the U.S. Constitution, and the Laws of the United States, are the supreme law of the land. (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.)

2) Provides that every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except as provided. (42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983").)

3) Establishes the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which authorizes injured parties to bring certain tort suits against the United States, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, except as provided. This includes claims against the United States, for money damages for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. (28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq.)

4) Provides that the above remedies are exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages by reason of the same subject matter against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim or against the estate of such employee. Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee's estate is precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred. (28 U.S.C. § 2679 ("Westfall Act").)

Existing state law:

1) Establishes the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Tom Bane Act), which provides that if a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney, or the person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights was interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, may institute a

civil action for damages, including a $25,000 civil penalty, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise enjoyment of the rights secured, and the court may award the petitioner or plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees. (Civ. Code § 52.1.)

This bill:

1) Establishes the No Kings Act.

2) Provides that every person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of this state or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except as provided.

3) Provides that "color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" includes color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of the United States and of any state or territory or the District of Columbia.

4) Establishes proper venue for actions brought hereto. The bill permits the court in such actions to award a prevailing plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs and expert fees, except as provided. A civil action brought hereto shall not be commenced later than two years after the date that the cause of action accrues.

5) Preserves the defense of absolute or qualified immunity to the same extent as a person sued under Section 1983 under like circumstances. Nothing herein shall be construed to waive or abrogate any defense of sovereign immunity otherwise available to a party. However, these provisions do not alter, amend, create, or support a qualified or absolute immunity defense or a sovereign immunity defense in any other action or proceeding brought under any other provision of California law.

6) Includes a severability clause.

7) Applies retroactively to March 1, 2025.

8) Provides that it is an urgency statute to take effect immediately in order to provide sufficient redress for the infringement of the civil liberties of all persons in the state as soon as possible.

COMMENTS

1. A gap in protections against federal officials' constitutional violations

Section 1983, first enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, allows private parties to sue state actors who violate their rights under "the Constitution and laws" of the United States. Specifically, it provides a cause of action for violation of such rights by persons acting under "color of" state laws and regulations. However, this does not provide a cause of action against federal officials.

To ensure the protection of constitutional rights in the face of federal action, the United States Supreme Court in *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics* (1971) 403 U.S. 388, 396, created a federal analog to suits brought against state and local officials pursuant to Section 1983. The Court held that violations of a person's Fourth Amendment rights are actionable even though "the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation." The Court looked back to the principles laid out in one of its earliest decisions in reading such a remedy into the law: "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." (*Marbury v. Madison* (1803) 1 Cranch 137, 163.)

While this holding, and subsequent expansions in other cases to other constitutional rights, have provided a basis for seeking redress against federal officials for such injuries, the courts have severely curtailed its application in recent years. The Supreme Court in *Egbert v. Boule* (2022) 596 U.S. 482, 490-492, "emphasized that recognizing a cause of action under *Bivens* is 'a disfavored judicial activity.'" The opinion in *Egbert* finds:

> When asked to imply a *Bivens* action, "our watchword is caution." "[I]f there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy[,] the courts must refrain from creating [it]." "[E]ven a single sound reason to defer to Congress" is enough to require a court to refrain from creating such a remedy. Put another way, "the most important question is who should decide whether to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts?" If there is a rational reason to think that the answer is "Congress"—as it will be in most every case . . .—no *Bivens* action may lie.

(*Egbert*, at 491-492 (internal citations omitted).)

Other federal laws and judicial doctrines provide alternative methods for addressing constitutional violations by federal officials, but each method is limited, has additional hurdles involved, and fails to provide the same baseline protection that Section 1983 does in the state actor context.

For instance, persons may seek to enjoin federal official from further constitutional violations, but the standing requirements are onerous, requiring a plaintiff to show specific, concrete, and imminent future injury before proceeding. (*See Los Angeles v. Lyons* (1983) 461 U.S. 95, 105.) Earlier this year, the Supreme Court made these limitations clear. Plaintiffs in *Perdomo v. Noem* (2025) 790 F. Supp. 3d 850, 863, challenged federal immigration officials' "roving patrols" indiscriminately rounding up individuals without reasonable suspicion. Plaintiffs simply sought to order the federal government to stop and the federal district court granted a temporary injunction against those patrols. However, the Supreme Court granted the federal government's motion to stay that holding, and the court, in a concurrence, illustrated the burdens of seeking to enjoin federal officials even when a constitutional violation is established:

> [U]nder this Court's decision in *Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U. S. 95, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983), plaintiffs likely lack Article III standing to seek a broad injunction restricting immigration officers from making these investigative stops. In *Lyons*, the Court held that standing to obtain future injunctive relief does not exist merely because plaintiffs experienced past harm and fear its recurrence. What matters is the "reality of the threat of repeated injury," not "subjective apprehensions." So too here.
>
> Plaintiffs' standing theory largely tracks the theory rejected in *Lyons*. Like in *Lyons*, plaintiffs here allege that they were the subjects of unlawful law enforcement actions in the past—namely, being stopped for immigration questioning allegedly without reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence. And like in *Lyons*, plaintiffs seek a forward-looking injunction to enjoin law enforcement from stopping them without reasonable suspicion in the future. But like in *Lyons*, plaintiffs have no good basis to believe that law enforcement will unlawfully stop them in the future based on the prohibited factors—and certainly no good basis for believing that any stop of the plaintiffs is imminent. Therefore, they lack Article III standing: "Absent a sufficient likelihood" that the plaintiffs "will again be wronged in a similar way," they are "no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional."

(*Noem v. Perdomo* (2025) 222 L. Ed. 2d 1213, 1215 (internal citations omitted).)

Similarly, actions pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) are fraught with procedural hurdles, limitations, and the preclusion of other claims for the relevant unlawful conduct.

Injured plaintiffs have attempted to use California law to fill this gap, but recent opinions have drawn the effectiveness of such methods into question. For instance,

plaintiffs in *Quinonez v. United States* (2023) 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153482, alleged constitutional violations against federal officials seeking relief under *Bivens*, the Westfall Act, and the First and Fourth Amendments. But the federal district court denied all of those claims, finding none of them provided a cause of action to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then sought to assert claims pursuant to California's Bane Act, which provides that if a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney, or the person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights was interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, may institute a civil action for damages, including a $25,000 civil penalty, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise enjoyment of the rights secured, and the court may award the petitioner or plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees. The district court rejected this approach:

> The issue is futility, and it depends on the relationship between the Bane Act, the Westfall Act, and the FTCA.
>
> The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for "certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment." The Westfall Act "accords federal employees absolute immunity from common law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties." As the Supreme Court explained in *Osborn [v. Haley* (2007) 549 U.S. 225, 229]:
>
> > When a federal employee is sued for wrongful or negligent conduct, the Act empowers the Attorney General to certify that the employee "was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose. Upon the Attorney General's certification, the employee is dismissed from the action, and the United States is substituted as defendant in place of the employee. The litigation is thereafter governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act.
>
> "The substitution leads, in effect, to a single avenue of recovery against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act."
>
> The Westfall Act does not, however, apply to civil actions against government employees "brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A). The plaintiffs contend that this caveat provides room to assert First and Fourth Amendment violations under the Bane Act . . . .

> The United States argues that the Westfall Act does not authorize Bane Act claims against the individual defendants because it is a "state law cause of action sounding in tort even predicated on violations of the constitution and other statutes." It further argues that the Bane Act claims could not be asserted against the United States because the United States did not waive sovereign immunity for such claims under the FTCA. The plaintiffs' requested amendments are another attempt to circumvent the combined limitations of the Westfall Act and FTCA. They made similar arguments on the motions to dismiss, arguing that the Westfall Act "could be read to preserve . . . state tort remedies in cases alleging a violation of the Constitution by federal officials." I declined to create such a caveat then, and I decline to do so now.

(*Quinonez*, at *8-9*; see also Haynes v. Hanson*, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58773, *7-8 fn. 2 ("Plaintiff's proposal to bring a Bane Act claim against a federal employee fails as a matter of law"); *Hernandez v. Mesa* (2020) 140 S. Ct. 735, 748 (2020) (describing the FTCA as "the exclusive remedy for most claims against government employees arising out of their official conduct").)

2. Filling in the gap to protect Californians

According to the author:

> Senate Bill 747 provides a clear statutory pathway to sue any official — federal, state, or local — who violates a Californian's federal rights under the United States Constitution. This bill affirms that the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the United States.
>
> Currently, federal law allows citizens to sue state and local officials for constitutional violations, however, there is no statutory equivalent for federal officials. Historically, courts relied on an implied right to sue, but the Supreme Court has severely curtailed this doctrine. This has created a dangerous double standard where federal agents effectively cannot be sued for damages, even for willful violations of constitutional rights. SB 747 creates a legal claim in state court for anyone injured by a government official's unconstitutional acts. This replaces blind trust in executive good faith with an enforceable remedy before an independent tribunal.
>
> Californians need a way to stand up to this Administration's unprecedented disregard for their Constitutional rights. Our rights mean little if government agents can violate Constitutional rights of Californians without consequences. By providing for a universal remedy for violations of the United States Constitution, SB 747 ensures that Californians can

> exercise their constitutional rights knowing they are enforceable rights, not just hollow promises.

This bill seeks to fill the gap by codifying a state analog of Section 1983 that provides Californians a cause of action to remedy constitutional violations committed by federal officials. It provides that every person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of this state or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except as provided. This closely mirrors Section 1983 but does not limit application to those acting under the color of state law, specifically providing that "color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" includes "color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of the United States and of any state or territory or the District of Columbia." It also explicitly authorizes courts to award prevailing plaintiffs in such actions with reasonable attorney's fees and costs and expert fees.
The bill also makes clear that it does not curtail the ability of defendants to assert sovereign immunity or absolute or qualified immunity as can be asserted under Section 1983 claims.

The bill applies its provisions retroactively to March 1, 2025. This provides a remedy for those who have had their rights violated in the last year, including as a result of recent incursions of federal officers into California, namely the immigration raids in southern California. The recent tragic shooting of a woman in Minnesota by ICE agents, at least the ninth ICE shooting in just the last four months, along with a host of other violent encounters across the country emphasizes the urgency for providing an avenue to vindicate our constitutional rights.[1]

Proponents argue that this bill does not afford any new rights, but merely affords a remedy for specific violations of existing constitutional or statutory law. The sponsors of the bill, Protect Democracy United, the Inland Coalition for Immigrant Justice, and Prosecutors Alliance Action make the case:

> SB 747 is necessary to correct an imbalance in how federal, state, and local officials are held accountable to the Constitution. While a federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allows people to sue state and local officials for

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[1] *See* Chris Hippensteel, Albert Sun & Jill Cowan, *Deadly Minneapolis Encounter Is the 9th ICE Shooting Since September* (January 7, 2026) The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/07/us/ice-shootings-minneapolis-other-cities.html; Leo Stallworth & Leanne Suter, *ICE agents ram car to take man into custody in Boyle Heights* (June 11, 2025) ABC 7 News, https://abc7.com/post/federal-agents-involved-boyle-heights-crash-accused-hit-run-lapd-investigating/16724558/; Jose Olivares, *US citizen detained by immigration officials who dismissed his Real ID as fake* (May 24, 2025) The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/may/24/us-citizen-detained-ice-real-id. All internet citations current as of January 9, 2026.

> constitutional violations, no equivalent federal law exists for suing federal officials. Instead, people injured by federal officials have historically relied on a "*Bivens* action"—a limited, implied right to sue directly under the Constitution.
>
> Making matters worse, the Supreme Court has sharply curtailed the availability of Bivens actions in recent years. And as *Bivens* has been narrowed, a dangerous gap has emerged: federal officers often have *de facto* immunity and cannot be sued for damages, even for willful violations of constitutional rights. This disparity—where federal officers operate without the same accountability as state and local actors—violates the longstanding and foundational legal principle that "every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803).
> Senate Bill 747 closes that accountability gap. By providing for a clear statutory pathway to sue any official—federal, state, or local—who violates the Constitution, it affirms that the United States Constitution (and not the whims of any governmental official) is the supreme law of the United States. Most importantly, by providing for a universal remedy for violations of the United States Constitution, SB 747 will ensure that Californians can exercise their constitutional rights knowing they are enforceable rights, not just hollow promises.

3. Legal challenges to the bill

Some stakeholders have raised concerns regarding the legal viability of creating such a cause of action at the state level despite its scope being limited to violations of rights afforded by existing constitutional law. While the bill is very likely to be challenged by the federal government if signed into law, case law has provided some encouragement that a bill such as this could successfully thread the needle and avoid federal preemption.

A concurrence in one recent federal opinion outlines the bleak options currently available but argues that a properly crafted state law claim could bridge the gap:

> Tort suits against federal officers are channeled through the Federal Tort Claims Act. That's because another statute — the Westfall Act — makes the FTCA "the exclusive remedy for most claims against [federal] employees arising out of their official conduct." So tort victims generally cannot sue federal officers personally under state law.
>
> But the FTCA's remedies are limited. It puts procedural and substantive limits on claims that would otherwise be available under state law. That

> leaves some victims of officers' unconstitutional conduct without compensation. . . .
>
> That gap was temporarily filled, in part, by *Bivens* suits — damages actions implied under the Constitution. But the modern Supreme Court has all-but removed that option. Since 1980, the Court has refused to expand Bivens beyond three narrow contexts. . . . Does that leave today's Plaintiffs with no remedy for federal officers' allegedly unconstitutional conduct? They say it does. I'm not so sure. For most of our history, state tort suits were the primary mechanism for holding federal officers accountable. And an overlooked exception to the Westfall Act may allow some of those suits to proceed today. . . .
>
> If federal officers had been above the law at the Founding, the new rights won at Yorktown and guaranteed by the Bill of Rights would have been significantly declawed. For that reason, some judges and scholars have said prohibiting all damages actions against federal officers might be a constitutional problem today. But those concerns may be premature. It's possible that a careful reading of the Westfall Act avoids any constitutional problem by preserving state tort suits against federal officers for constitutional violations.
>
> Recall that the Westfall Act generally prohibits tort victims from bringing state tort suits against federal officers, forcing victims instead to pursue the limited remedies in the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). But the Westfall Act does not preclude "a civil action . . . brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States." Though overlooked, that exception may allow state tort suits "brought for" constitutional violations to proceed.

(*Buchanan v. Barr* (2023) 71 F.4th 1003, 1013-1016 (concurring opinion, internal citations omitted).)

This bill may properly take advantage of that exception and allow those whose constitutional rights have been violated by government officials to finally have a proper path to redress.

4. Stakeholder positions

The Orange County Board of Supervisors writes in support:

> SB 747 is essential to ensure that the constitutional rights of all Californians are protected, including when that interference comes from individuals acting under the color of authority. The bill reaffirms that no

> one, government official or otherwise, is above the law and that abuse of power must be held accountable.

A number of California law enforcement groups write in opposition to the bill and argue that the bill represents an expansion of potential liability for them. The Peace Officers' Research Association of California argues:

> The amended bill adds Section 53.8 to the Civil Code, mirroring the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by imposing liability on any person acting "under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage" who deprives a California citizen or person within the state's jurisdiction of rights secured by the U.S. Constitution. Unlike the Bane Act, which requires proof of interference through threats, intimidation, or coercion and a specific intent to violate rights. *Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles*, 203 Cal.App.4th 947 (2012). Section 53.8 contains no such limiting elements.
>
> This represents a significant expansion of liability from the current framework, where courts have emphasized that the Bane Act addresses only "egregious interferences with constitutional rights" involving "deliberate or spiteful" conduct. By creating a parallel and independent pathway for claims, lowering the threshold to mere constitutional deprivations under an objective reasonableness standard, SB 747 dramatically increases litigation risks for peace officers. Officers making good-faith decisions in rapidly evolving situations could face lawsuits in state court without the heightened intent standard that has served as a functional safeguard under existing law.

The author disagrees:

> 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes civil liability on state and local officials that violate the United States Constitution. Thus, the law already requires state and local officers to follow the Constitution, and imposes a damages remedy when they do not do so. Nonetheless, the bill would allow suit against state and local officers in addition to federal officers.
>
> The bill does so in an attempt to avoid any constitutional question with respect to the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. . . .
>
> [A]s a practical matter, the bill will not expand the liability of state and local officials. That's because the bill specifically includes reference to the immunity defenses that state and local officials presently have in Section 1983 actions. Under existing federal law, state and local officials have qualified immunity from damages claims unless their actions violated

> clearly established constitutional law. (*See Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Thus, the bill will not expand the liability of state and local officials beyond the liability they already have under Section 1983.
>
> Further, any action brought under the bill in superior court in California — even those brought against state and local officials—should be removable to federal court by the defendants if defendants choose to do so.

A coalition of other law enforcement groups, including the Riverside Sheriffs' Association, take issue with the retroactivity element of the bill:

> SB 747's retroactive application to March 1, 2025, raises serious fairness and continuity concerns. Retroactive expansions of civil liability are strongly disfavored as they alter legal consequences after the fact and undermine settled expectations for public agencies and employees who acted under existing law.

The California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation makes the case for the bill:

> In California, actions by federal officers from the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have resulted in arrests and detention of United States Citizens, property losses, and caused physical and emotional harm to both adults and children. These are not isolated incidents, increasingly people are being injured by actions that require more accountability and clarity under the law by which people may seek remedies. The issue is whether ICE and other federal officers can be sued for damages and for willful violations of a person's U.S. constitutional rights in a clear and direct manner.
>
> Currently, there are two ways to sue federal officials and United States for monetary and injunctive relief. First, is a "*Bivens*" action by a lawsuit against a federal official under a constitutional tort theory. Second, is by bringing a lawsuit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). However, the United States Supreme Court has narrowed the interpretation of the laws resulting in the need to correct the ability for people to seek judicial relief from the harm caused by federal official's unlawful conduct. Moreover, the FTCA process is procedurally and administratively complex.
>
> In contrast, state and local law enforcement officials have more accountability than federal officials acting unlawfully in California, which is where the gap exists that needs to close.

SB 747 will hold federal law enforcement officers accountable for state or federal violations by requiring direct and unequivocal statutory authority.

SUPPORT

Inland Coalition for Immigrant Justice (sponsor)
Prosecutors Alliance Action (sponsor)
Protect Democracy United (sponsor)
California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc.
County of Sonoma
National Union of Healthcare Workers
Orange County Board of Supervisors

OPPOSITION

Arcadia Police Officers' Association
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS)
Brea Police Association
Burbank Police Officers' Association
California Association of Highway Patrolmen
California Association of School Police Chiefs
California Coalition of School Safety Professionals
California Narcotic Officers' Association
California Peace Officers Association
California Police Chiefs Association
California Reserve Peace Officers Association
California State Sheriffs' Association
Claremont Police Officers Association
Corona Police Officers Association
Culver City Police Officers' Association
Fullerton Police Officers' Association
Los Angeles Police Protective League
Los Angeles School Police Management Association
Los Angeles School Police Officers Association
Murrieta Police Officers' Association
Newport Beach Police Association
Orange County Sheriff's Department
Palos Verdes Police Officers Association
Peace Officers Research Association of California
Placer County Deputy Sheriffs' Association
Pomona Police Officers' Association
Riverside County Sheriff's Office
Riverside Police Officers Association
Riverside Sheriffs' Association

RELATED LEGISLATION

Pending Legislation: None known.

Prior Legislation:

SB 771 (Stern, 2025) would have created, effective January 1, 2027, a civil action against a social media platform, as defined, with over $100 million in gross annual revenues that aids and abets the commission of, conspires with a person to violate, or is a joint tortfeasor for a violation of, specified civil rights and hate crime laws. Governor Newsom vetoed the bill, stating in part:

> I support the author's goal of ensuring that our nation-leading civil rights laws apply equally both online and offline. I likewise share the author's concern about the growth of discriminatory threats, violence, and coercive harassment online. I am concerned, however, that this bill is premature. Our first step should be to determine if, and to what extent, existing civil rights laws are sufficient to address violations perpetrated through algorithms. To the extent our laws prove inadequate, they should be bolstered at that time.

PRIOR VOTES:

Prior votes not relevant to current version of the bill.

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